ital in the spring of 2005, and still the best we could do for a broad based legal text was a practice manuaJ.2 There are certainly aspects (2008) INQUIRY 679 (1996) .
2. On the advice of Joseph Grundfest, who offered a similar course at Stanford, I assigned CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR'S GUIDE TO BUSINESS LAW, (2007) , and ALEX WILMERDING, TERM SHEETS & VALUATIONS (2004) , in addition to a course package with assorted readings on various subjects. I considered using JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS (Martin D. Ginsburg & Donald E. Rocap eds., 2007), but it is heavily oriented to tax planning (although it is the benchmark on that subject). Another candidate was JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, FUNDAMENTALS OF VENTURE of the entrepreneurship process that have imported significant as pects of contract, tax planning, corporate, and intellectual property law. Yet, the only unique jurisprudence of entrepreneurial law I have yet been able to identify is the law applying anti-dilution clauses in what is known as the "down round"-where the startup company has a lower value in later rounds of financing, and either the founders or the investors have to bear the brunt of the 10ss.3 Two of the most accomplished "law and entrepreneurship" scholars have attempted to do away with the elephant in the room-namely, that the same criticism Frank Easterbrook levied about the law of cyberspace nearly fifteen years ago might well be transferred to the law of entrepreneurship today: "there was no more a 'law of cyber space' than there was a 'Law of the Horse.'''4 Instead, "law and entrepreneurship" thrives not in doctrine, or even in current inter disciplinary law and social science, but on the ground in clinical programs. 5 Neither the profession nor the academy has yet figured out how the legal profession should best assist this unusual creature, the entrepreneur. 6 Entrepreneurs face all sorts of contingencies: cash flow problems, partner breakups, natural disasters, loss of a major customer, new competition, industry change, loss of key personnel, CAPITAL (1999) , which I described in the syllabus as "a handy little volume that de scribes issues. It does not contain forms or voluminous details on structuring." In prac tice, I had admired START-UP & EMERGING COMPANIES: PLANNING, FINANCING AND OPERATING THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS (Gregory C. Smith ed., 1997), but it was simply too expensive and, in some areas, too outdated to assign to students.
3. See Smith, Independent Legal Significance, supra note 1. 45 . Professor Utset characterized the typical founding entrepreneur as "over-optimistic," "overconfi dent" (indeed to the point of "blind [ness] ... to the need for more information"), better at innovating than running a company, having "poor management skills," lacking "busi ness savvy," and having "bounded rationality" (unable to plan well for contingencies). Id. at 92-93, 100-04, 114 n.228. theft and embezzlement, and family problems.? Who is better equipped than a well-trained lawyer to assist a client in planning ahead? But how many of these contingencies are addressable in advance by the tools we teach lawyers? The primary means by which business lawyers attempt to impose order on the contingency of the heteronomous world is the institution of contract which, not withstanding rational actor and behavioral economic theory to the contrary, is limited at best. 8 Only a few of the remedies to this set of problems suggested by one popular pundit were expressly legal: draw up a partnership agreement with a buy-sell mechanism; have adequate insurance policies against natural disaster, fraud, and theft; and develop an estate plan for the owner-operator. 9 Despite valiant (if nascent) efforts to show that law, or at least courts and doctrine, matter in the broader study of entrepreneur ship,lO I am skeptical that it really does, for reasons that underlie my broader view about the relationship of law to business and ev eryday life. To put it bluntly, my observation after a long career in the business world, which included the representation of startup en trepreneurs as well as would-be entrepreneurs in the corporate set ting, is that "law" makes a lot more difference to lawyers than to anybody else. 9. Abrams, supra note 7. This is not to suggest that there are no legal issues that are core to the venture capital business. But like the "law of the horse," it is an amal gam of tax, choice of entity, and other business-planning issues. The one area that is unique is the so-called down round issue.
10. See supra note 1. 11. Abrams, supra note 7. See generally Smith & Ueda, supra note 1, at 366-68. When sophisticated business people think about agreements and send their lawyers off to scriven, are the lawyers writing the agreements for courts or for each other? Whether or not contracts are interpreted textually or contextually, it is probably fair to say that the lawyers, if you asked them, were doing their best to make the entire agree ment textual, and not contextual. And the reason for textuality is that the writing will be read and interpreted by others. Or will it? Have you ever set aside a draft and re read it a year later? Or re-read an old article that you wrote five or six years ago? Who wrote it? So I think there is something far more nuanced going on than the rational model that we write contracts because we are addressing the hypothetical judge who will resolve our disputes, and in doing so, apply ex ante the rules that have been laid down legally or linguistically, as a way now of controlling the future. This judgment is not teachable and, instead, is learnable only through practice. Judgment-how we infer regularities in the data of the world or decide how to subsume the next encounter with data under an existing rule-is still the great mystery of cognitive science and moral philosophy. In philosophy and jurisprudence this falls under the topic of "rule-following," and I contend here that there are inherent philosophical (and perhaps psychological) problems with the interaction of the lawyer and the entrepreneur.
In this essay, I will explore three rationales to explain why law yers and entrepreneurs are like ships passing in the night: first, there is no rule about how to apply rules; second, lawyers struggle with the kind of judgment that comes naturally to the entrepreneur; and third, the nature of a legal solution is essentially cognitive and does not address the non-cognitive aspects of entrepreneurship.
First, as philosophers have shown, there is no rule for the appli cation of a rule, and what we perceive as a given result is a matter of social congruence rather than a result inherent in the rule itself.14 12. Jeffrey M. The social and psychological orientation of those who create law, and those who create innovation, are at odds. As an illustration, a lawyer's lawyer sees the world in relatively simple models by which contracts are supposed to inhibit opportunism-e.g., the futures contract for the purchase and sale of wheat that gives the buyer a remedy against the seller's opportunism when the contract price was $100 and the market price on the date of sale is $120. Indeed, the law is an element of the heteronomous world; it controls, re stricts, and limits the choices of the free agent.
The entrepreneur, on the other hand, sees the world as a move able feast of phenomena, posing danger but presenting opportuni ties to be seized and exploited, with choices to be made over and over again. One entrepreneurship scholar sees the entrepreneur's mode of reasoning as effectual rather than causal: while causal rea soning posits a goal and seeks means to achieve the goal, "effectual reasoning ... begins with a given set of means and allows goals to emerge contingently over time from the varied imagination and di verse aspirations of the founders and the people they interact with."15 Philosophers teach that " [t] here is no rule for the applica tion of a rule," and it might be the entrepreneurs' creed, because what the philosophers are really telling us is that what we think are rules for the application of a rule are not inherent in the rule, but in our social constructs around it. Most of us have a common and unremarkable understanding that the rule of 2-4-6-8 means that the answer is 10; the entrepreneur may see it as 12 or 19 or 1-5-6.1 6 The law calls for consistency and coherence in the application of rulesP I suggest that entrepreneurs are far more at home with inconsis tency and indeterminacy. 734-45 (1999) At the risk of losing my readers (if they are not already lost) in abstraction, my intuition is that this is traceable to the different ways entrepreneurs and lawyers might explain why things happen, which invokes the question of causation. Hart and Honore pro duced the most thorough discussion to date of the legal concept of causation.IS They sought to distinguish the "historian's and the law yer's and the plain man's use of causal notions" from those of the scientist. 19 The goal of the former is to distinguish the singular cause of a particular event from the set of all conditions that were necessary for the event to occur. The goal of the latter, and the great breakthrough of David Hume and the empiricists, was to do away with singular causes (at least in the sense of divine or mystical ones) in favor of causation that "lies wholly in the fact that the par ticular events with which they are concerned exemplify some gener alization asserting that kinds or classes of events are invariably connected."20 We can call this latter scientific causal statement "nomological-deductive" and the former common sense causal statement "attributive."21 I think the "law and entrepreneurship" issue invokes causation in two ways. First, different external observers might make either nomological-deductive or attributive causal statements about trans actions to which they are not parties. The irony in the Hart and Honore treatment of Hume, I think, is that a law, as a closed sys tem, aspires to scientific notions of causation within the system, and regularly ignores or discounts nonlegal attributive causes. A good example is in Ibrahim and Smith's defense of law's relevance to en trepreneurship. tive explanation: California law governing non-compete agree ments.24 Both are scientific statements: if we could reproduce the particular events, like cultural norms or certain laws, we could gen eralize that entrepreneurs would flourish as a consequence. I do not know who is right; I am suspicious, however, that lawyers' hy potheses about the importance of law are more likely to be wishful thinking than borne out empirically.
Further, these nomological-deductive statements still do not get at the mystery of judgment. My Suffolk colleague, Eric Blumenson, puts the distinction nicely in his article about the limits of skepticism. 25 Trying to inform decision-making practice from an outside perspective is a category mistake that conflates two alternative views of human action-the views from "inside" (doing it) and "outside" (observ ing it).... From the external standpoint, one sees predictable patterns of behavior, not autonomous subjects capable of tran scending history through reason. But this view has no "cash value" for the agent making the decision. 26 The philosopher Christine Korsgaard similarly criticized a dis passionate and reductive scientism-"a description of the world which serves the purposes of explanation and prediction"-as inca pable of guiding the agent "when we must make our decisions and choices 'under the idea of freedom.' "27 In short, all the science in the world may inform our judgment or explain the circumstances of judgment, but it is not the same as making the judgment.
My position is not that law does not matter; it is that, in the sense of what lawyers do to reduce transactional complexity to lin guistic precision as a matter of "rule-following" and prediction, it barely matters. What matters is not a particular doctrine that might be created in the law of entrepreneurship. My intuition is, instead, that the rule of law as a social phenomenon, which has "cash-value" to the decision-maker (in Eric Blumenson's terms), is what is fun damentally important about law and entrepreneurship. Entrepre neurship flourishes in a society that builds the rule of law from Lockean assumptions about the primacy of property and the free 24 30. See id. at 306. To follow the Smith-Ueda thesis, is there a relationship be tween that underlying libertarianism and the presence of a common, rather than civil, law? See Smith & Ueda, supra note 1, at 353-54. I am not enough of a political theorist to know. Judges could put a crimp on the economic incentives to creative destruction, but so could legislatures and executives. But to me, that's like holding the tiller of a small boat on the crest of a tsunami and thinking that because you can impede or en hance the progress of the boat, you control the tsunami. Do tiller-people matter? Yes, but not nearly as much as the tiller-people think. In this analogy, the entrepreneurs are the seismic causes of the tsunami. preneurship is about something other than jurisprudence. 3 ! Put another way, lawyers do not precede the rule of law; rather, a social consensus that we will abide by the rule of law permits lawyers to flourish.
The second theme is that lawyers (or the law) struggle with the kind of judgment that comes naturally to the entrepreneur. 32 The creation of law is ex post; the presumption-whether in Langdellian legal science, Holmesian legal realism,33 the currently dominant ap proach of rational actor, or behavioral economics-must be that ac tors may determine, to a greater or lesser extent, legal outcomes by a rational ex ante prediction of those judgments, and to control the outcomes with a reductive rule-based model, be it contract or other regulation. 34 None of these models accounts for the inherent para dox (or antinomy) of judgment. As elucidated by Kant, the issue with judgment is that we understand that the conclusion is ours alone (and people can differ), but at the same time we ascribe universality to the conclusion. This is one of the themes of the Cri . 486, 487-88 (2007) . Profes sor Steven Hobbs attempted to put the legal aspects of entrepreneurship toward a gen eral theory, but the result is really just a small-business lawyer's tool kit, combined with finance and public policy impacts on the field. See generally Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REv. 241 (1997) .
32. See Lipshaw, Bewitchment of Intelligence, supra note 11, at 5-6. See generally Lipshaw, Law's Illusion, supra note 12.
33. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa chusetts, The Path of the Law, Address at the Boston University School of Law dedica tion (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465-66 (1897) .
34. A lawyer acting as lawyer looks from the outside in, seeking to explain and predict. See id. But the entrepreneur is the agent who must operate under the idea of freedom. Both Blumenson and Korsgaard follow Kant in seeing the desire of pure reason to explain the world as if from no perspective, and in antinomical relation to the agent, who must necessarily have a perspective. Compare KORSGAARD, supra note 27, and Blumenson, supra note 25, with KANT, supra note 14. Kant's view is that pure reason is incapable of establishing empirical truth (the "is"), but can be employed prac tically to determine the "ought." See IMMANUEL KANT, CRmQUE OF PRAcnCAL REA SON (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1788).
tique of Judgment.35
When we look at a painting, we simulta neously (a) know it is just a matter of taste, but (b) ascribe some objective standard of bad, good, better, worse, and best to the art. 36 If there were an algorithm for judgment, we would not prize it in individuals the way we do, and we would be letting our computers, rather than our lawyers, negotiate our deals. The entrepreneur's lawyer has to balance these two dynamics: (1) the lawyerly sense that such-and-such a provision really should go into the agreement "to cover you just in case this-and-that happens," and (2) the busi ness sense that the same provision could stop the deal in its tracks. That is the antimony of deal lawyering, because from the center of any such problem, you can always argue your way to either anti thetical conclusion. 37
The third theme is that the very nature of a legal or regulatory solution, by and large, is cognitive, and fails to address the noncognitive aspects of entrepreneurship. I contend it is the law yer's place to assume the primacy of the lawyer's particular world view: if I process sensory data in a cognitive way, so must every body else. What do I mean by a cognitive solution? Take the issue of disclosure as a cure; that is, "sunlight is the best disinfectant."38 There was recently a proposal that public company proxy state ments should include a detailed description of the heuristics by which the board determines CEO pay, and that this would some how cause the perceived excessive CEO pay problem to be cured. 39 I am skeptical. If the cognitive approach really worked, then we ought to be able to reduce housing prices in California by making every house buyer read a prospectus on the likelihood that the house is overpriced in relation to equivalent homes in Milwaukee or Des Moines, and in danger of destruction by tsunami, earth quake, or high force Santa Ana winds. 
36
. 37. When I am asked "how do you know which way to go?" my response is the same as that of the Geoffrey Rush character in the movie Shakespeare in Love, who explained why everything in the hectic production of a play always works out despite that "the natural condition [of the theater business] is one of insurmountable obstacles on the road to imminent disaster": "I don't know; it's a mystery." SHAKESPEARE IN LoVE (Universal Pictures 1998 So what we find is that lawyers (or people who "think like law yers") tend either to pose noncognitive issues as cognitive, or pro pose cognitive solutions to noncognitive problems. 40 The question here is not whether the entrepreneur or the lawyer is right or wrong in his or her application of the rules to circumstances, but whether they are even speaking the same language. 41 I suggest that we can 40. In Manuel Utset's article, he proposed that venture capitalists be required to provide something like an S-l prospectus to the entrepreneur, designed to remedy the perceived inequalities between entrepreneurs and the supposedly more sophisticated venture capitalist. Utset, supra note 6, at 161-63. I have observed that there is some thing of an infinite regress inherent in a solution that is merely more information particularly one that smacks of the typical disclaimers that go, for example, into an SEC registration statement for an initial public offering. I commented on this: "In sum, the starry-eyed, cocky, sheltered engineer or scientist lacking people skills and a crystal ball is probably already overwhelmed with information. The regress is in trying to find that conclusive piece of information or disclosure that gets through to this kind of personal ity." Lipshaw, Contingency and Contracts, supra note 8, at 1093 n.69.
In Germany, even today, if you sell a piece of real estate, or if you sell a multibil lion dollar company that involves the transfer of real estate, the civil code requires that the transaction be undertaken in a notarial deed. This is hardly the notarial act of a U.S. common law jurisdiction. The notary undertakes (for a significant fee) to serve the function that legality, enforceability representations, and lawyers' opinions serve here. The notary is putting the imprimatur of legality on the agreement. And if you have ever been party to one of these events, you know that the notary (or someone delegated by the notary) is required to read the entire document out loud (even if it's a 400-page document including exhibits that are essentially Wall Street firm-generated doorstops). This is an anachronism dating back to the Middle Ages, when the law prevented big city sharpies from cheating the peasants (who generally couldn't read) out of their land. This, I assume, was the legal equivalent of taking the about-to-be-victim, shaking him (probably not her back then) physically about the head and shoulders, and saying "do you understand what a stupid thing you are about to do?" 41. Compare the cognitive and non-cognitive approaches in a scene from Robert Penn Warren's All the King's Men. Willie Stark, the Huey Long equivalent, begins his political career as an honest idealist, duped into running in the Democratic primary as a way of splitting the vote. Willie has been giving a boring stump speech, and this is the exchange he has with the cynical reporter covering his campaign on the subject of the cognitive approach:
"You tell 'em too much. Just tell 'em you're gonna soak the fat boys, and forget the rest of the tax stuff." "What we need is a balanced tax program. Right now the ratio between income tax and total income for the state gives an index that-" "Yeah," I said, "I heard the speech. But they don't give a damn about that. Hell, make 'em cry, or make 'em laugh, make 'em think you're their weak and erring pal, or make 'em think you're God-Almighty. Or make 'em mad. Even mad at you. Just stir 'em up, it doesn't matter how or why, and they'll love you and come back for more. Pinch 'em in the soft place. They aren't alive, most of 'em, and haven't been alive in twenty years .... [Ilt's up to you to give 'em something to stir 'em up and make 'em feel alive again. Just for half an hour. That's what they come for. Tell 'em anything. But for Sweet Jesus' sake don't try to improve their minds." ROBERT PENN WARREN, ALL THE KING's MEN 77 (1946). see the problem most clearly in the one place the law deals with the inherent antinomy of setting rules by which it determines whether the next case accords with preexisting rules: the patent system. 42 What constitutes creativity in lawyering is the occasional flash of inspiration that is more akin to the inventor's work and language than to that of the lawyer. 43 To summarize, there is a jurisprudential point to be made here about the limits of the law, or law's place in relation to other social institutions. There is, additionally, an implication for the training of lawyers, and the relationship of the academy to the practice. If there is as little doctrinally as I claim that is important about the law of entrepreneurship, what, if anything, of value (beyond the usual transaction cost reduction)44 does an entrepreneurial lawyer qua lawyer bring to the table? Here I want to suggest a fundamen tal distinction between the definition of one's presently ascertain able rights in property, and private ordering to deal with future contingency. To quote one professor quoting an unidentified Stan ford professor, what distinguishes the law of property is the "thing ness of it."45 In the former, the law comes as close as it ever does to being constitutive; in the latter, what we say now is merely ammuni tion for instrumental use later. 46 The import of this distinction is that the only thing truly interesting about the law of entrepreneur~ ship is more akin to the relationship of the law to property and liberty. The entrepreneur is significantly interested in those por~ tions of the term sheet that define property rights in the event of success. As to the rest of the lawyers' work-dealing with the reso~ lution of claims if the venture fails-it may bear the same stigma of the law of commercial contract boilerplate: it is of significant inter~ est to the lawyers, but has no real present interest to the business negotiators. 47 46. I recently purchased a home in Massachusetts. The residential real estate practices were unfamiliar to me, as was the specific property, which happens to be a condominium, although our particular unit is simply one of two buildings, the other of which is a duplex. I realized when I was scanning the condominium master deed and the condominium trust deed (effectively the organizing document of the condominium association), the only thing I really cared about were those provisions that define my present rights. So while I ignored most of the boilerplate, I read carefully the descrip tion of my unit, my rights to common areas, my rights to exclude others from certain areas, and my ability to control the decisions of the condominium trustees, at least as they affected me.
In light of this recent experience, I am pondering Professor Madison's proposal to wholly eliminate the deed as a means of conveyance, and to embody all of the rights, expectations, and liabilities in real estate ownership and transfer in the contract itself. See Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.V. L. REV. 405, 406 (2002) . To twist this to my point, I think Professor Madison is suggesting that the entire game involves those aspects of the transaction documents that deal with future contin gency, and that there is barely a dispute around the mundane aspects otherwise encap sulated in the deed, like the description of the property presently owned. See id. at 407 08.
47. I do not want to minimize the subject of contract boilerplate as between ad vantaged and disadvantaged parties. But I subscribe to the empirical view, at least on the subject of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, "that there seem to be two only slightly overlapping worlds out there: the world of business practice and the world of law. In the world of business practice, law is much less significant than reputation and leverage as forces that govern the day-to-day behavior of the actors." DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS ApPROACH 3 (3d ed. 2006). This is, of course, a restate ment of Professor Macaulay's "non-contract" view. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empiri cal View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465.
In fact, there were two presentations in a recent symposium on boilerplate provi sions in contracts that were not consumer contracts. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (2006) (proposing a theory by which sophisti cated parties might use boilerplate as an efficient coordinating mechanism by which the goal of reaching an agreement rather than "winning" might be achieved); Omri Ben Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Con tracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 953-54 (2006) (studying the boilerplate provisions in the contracts by which automobile manufacturers obtain parts from suppliers). Both arti cles are based upon a presumption that the contracts are constitutive of the business relationship and are not entirely clear, when talking about the impacts and strategies of boilerplate, precisely who the sophisticated parties are. Moreover, they presume, be cause economic theory says the terms ought to have a pricing impact, that the terms do have a pricing impact. As Professors Ben-Shahar and White found, there are several deal points beyond price about which business people in the auto industry care-termi nation rights, warranty obligations, ownership of intellectual property, for example but they are correct in observing that " [t] he legal terms in the forms are the tail that is wagged by the business dog, not vice versa." Ben-Shahar & White, supra, at 964. I suggest that the contracts qua contracts, as opposed to mere reflections or shadows of the deal points, are equally as much the tail of the dog, or less.
